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RODE JEUGD IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 
The Netherlands of the 20th century is hardly known for its rich tradition of political violence. 
However, first steps towards starting up an armed struggle were made also there at the same time as 
for example Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) started to operate in West Germany and the Weathermen 
conducted bomb attacks around the United States. These efforts were taken by radicals involved in 
a loose organisation called Rode Jeugd (Red Youth). Like other New Left organisations involved in 
armed struggle, also the adherents of Rode Jeugd were radicalised by the Vietnam war and believed 
that the world was in the brink of revolution. They thought their struggle was part of a worldwide 
struggle against imperialism and capitalism and looked at China as the leader of the struggle. 
However, the activities of Rode Jeugd or its successors never developed into the same scale those of 
RAF or Brigate Rosse in Italy. 
 
The protest phase 
 
In a historical account of Rode Jeugd published in its internal paper in 1973, group’s history is 
divided into two periods: the protest phase of the years 1966–1970 and the period of resistance with 
initiatives for the urban guerrilla in 1970–1973.1 After the organization was disbanded in 1974, 
many of its former members continued their involvement in armed struggle in the context of Rode 
Hulp (Red Help), Rood Verzetsfront (Red Resistance Front) and other networks.  
Rode Jeugd has roots in two directions - the protest movement of the mid-60’s and a small 
Maoist organization called Rode Vlag (Red Flag) which was established by former members of the 
Communist Party of the Netherlands who were dispelled from the party following the dispute 
between those supporting the line of China and the Soviet Union.
2
 
In the mid-60’s, the protest movement and mood was quickly building up in Amsterdam. 
The main phenomenon of these years was Provo which was established in 1965. This loosely 
organised movement was influenced by anarchist ideas and was best known for its style of protest. 
It aimed at provoking people by parodying the bourgeois values and way of living. Provo had a 
huge appeal on the protesting youths, and its gatherings draw together hundreds of people.
 3
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The development of youth protests were closely watched by members Rode Vlag. In their 
eyes, the spring 1966 marked an important turn. In March, thousands of youths gathered to 
Amsterdam to demonstrate during the wedding of Princess Beatrix who, despite the fact that the 
Nazi Germany had occupied the country a couple of decades ago, married a German prince. While 
the protests so far had been mostly cultural in character, this time there seemed to be clear political 
overtones. They were excited to see the youths coming to the streets to protest against the prevailing 
system, but they felt the youths lacked understanding on what they should do and who they should 
target. To help the protestors with this, the young members of Rode Vlag established a youth paper, 
which became called Rode Jeugd (Red Youth) and started to spread it among the protestors and 
thereby educate those on Marxism-Leninism.
4
 Two central figures behind the paper were Willem 
Oskam and Joost van Steenis, both 20-odd year prominent activists of the left-wing scene.  
Besides the youth, also workers seemed to be becoming more active. In June 1966, 
construction workers marched to the streets of Amsterdam to protest against uneven holiday 
bonuses. The demonstrations turned into riots when a man was found dead among the crowd. The 
demonstrators widely believed that he was killed by the police. When the morning edition of the 
populist-conservative newspaper De Telegraaf (correctly) reported that he died because of heart 
failure, the demonstrators, reinforced by many more people, stormed into its building.
5
  
In the aftermath of these riots, Rode Jeugd got its first moment of fame. A couple of days 
before they began, Rode Jeugd had been handing out its third pamphlet in the city centre of 
Amsterdam. The pamphlet listed a number of American banks and other locations with their 
addresses and a following text: 
Above is a short and very incomplete list of American companies and institutions where 
following things could be done: breaking windows, chalking anti-American slogans to 
the walls, setting on fire and so forth. But as several of our “left-wing” newspapers and 
weeklies [...] have already stated with fervour, and we fervently agree, something like 
that would be scandalous! That is certainly hooliganism. Creatures who do such things 
are dubious people, beggars of the worst kind.
6
  
 
The pamphlet landed into the hands of the widely respected novelist Godfried Bomans who accused 
Rode Jeugd in his op-ed of being the culprits behind the recent riots.
7
 The op-ed drew a lot of 
attention and led to the arrest of four Rode Jeugd members who were sentenced to four weeks in 
prison and a 1000 guilder fine. Bomans, however, got so much criticism for his writing and the 
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consequences it caused that he was forced to apologize. As a token of his regret, he donated 100 
guilders to the Rode Jeugd’s fundraising campaign to cover the fines and legal costs.8 
While Rode Vlag leaders were pleased with the initial success of the youths, their relations 
soon broke up. In the leaders’ view, instead of introducing the protesting youths to Marxism-
Leninism, their own youths had become badly infected by the playful anarchist style of Provo 
movement, which was the main phenomenon of the protests. When Willem Oskam praised Provo 
and slandered the working class on the pages of Rode Jeugd people, Rode Vlag had had it.
9
 The 
youths went on and establish Rode Jeugd as an independent organization in October 1967. Its first 
meeting, which was advertised during Provo activities, was attended by about 60 youths, many of 
whom joined the organization.
10
 
 The first years of Rode Jeugd were characterized by spontaneity and loose 
organization. Around the core of leaders and key members, there were perhaps a couple of hundred 
youths, mostly workers. Activists aligned with Rode Jeugd took part in demonstrations, published 
their own paper, chalked slogans to walls and distributed pamphlets. It did not have any concise and 
strictly defined political programme. Rather, its agenda and ideology was a mixture of Marxism-
Leninism and the concerns of the protest movement. It was involved in protests against the US and 
for the liberation movements and took part in almost any leftist demonstration that was organized in 
Amsterdam. On the other hand, it raised up more traditional working class issues like poor position 
of young workers in the labour markets, working conditions and wages in particular companies and 
the development of communist movements elsewhere in the world.
11
  
Rode Jeugd became soon known for its hard approach. They did not believe that 
peaceful protesting would lead to anywhere and advocated more confrontational methods. When the 
Rode Jeugd adherents were confronted with the police, they did not withdraw but stroke back. In 
the demonstrations, Rode Jeugd people carried flags and placards bound on a stout pale that were 
used as cudgel and many youths brought chains with them. It was exactly this militant attitude that 
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made Rode Jeugd attractive for those who got involved.
12
 This hard approach became an important 
part of its self-image and its trademark that distinguished it from other Marxist-Leninist 
organisations: 
De “Rode Jeugd”, the only consistent revolutionary organization in the Netherlands, 
WILL realize its action programme, step by step and despite intimidation or reactions 
that it gets. As Marxist-Leninists, we consider it our responsibility to respond with ALL 
means to the insults en challenges posed by imperialist capitalism.
13
 
 
The same hard approach, however, strained its relations with other Marxist-Leninist movements and 
to a degree with the protest movement of the day.
14
 By 1968, it had come so far that Rode Jeugd 
was often not invited to demonstrations anymore. For Rode Jeugd, though, being not invited 
seemed like the strongest invitation of all. An obviously frustrated Rode Vlag leader wrote about a 
Vietnam demonstration organized in October 1968: 
Because the [...] organizations had not dared to ask Rode Jeugd to participate 
(apparently because of the prior experiences!), they [Rode Jeugd] found it necessary to 
suddenly show up with slogans that had nothing to do with defending the Vietnamese 
people. The police got a reason to intervene when other demonstrators who wanted to 
remove these slogans got into fight with Rode Jeugd.
 15
 
 
While the activities of Rode Jeugd had started in Amsterdam, new branches were established in 
various towns in the late 1960s. These were established by people who had come to Amsterdam for 
demonstrations, met Rode Jeugd people and put together their own organisation back in their home 
town. New Rode Jeugd branches were established in Eindhoven, IJmuiden, Kampen, The Hague 
and several other cities (of which little was heard afterwards).
16
 Activities of different branches took 
varying forms as result of differences in local protest scene, reactions from the authorities and 
aspirations of local Rode Jeugd leaders. In most places, the actions did not really go much further 
than chalking, distributing pamphlets in the streets and companies, and participating in the 
demonstrations.  
The most important of the new branches was that of Eindhoven. Towards the end of 
1960s, it became a major locus of Rode Jeugd’s radical actions. Like in Amsterdam, Rode Jeugd in 
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Eindhoven emerged as a very open club of mostly working youths who were eager for action. The 
character of Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven, however, was strongly shaped by the local conditions 
together with the determination of its local leader, Henk Wubben. After returning from a thought-
provoking eight years of sailing with the mercantile marine, Wubben joined Rode Jeugd and 
established its branch in Eindhoven.
17
 
What comes to the local conditions, Eindhoven was a much more conservative city 
than Amsterdam. The city was largely run by one party (Katholieke Volkspartij, Catholic People’s 
Party), one company (Philips) and one publication (Eindhovens Dagblad, Eindhoven Daily). While 
in Amsterdam Rode Jeugd was one among many protesting groups, in Eindhoven it was practically 
the first youth group which outspokenly challenged the policies and values of the major power 
holders. Reaction of the authorities was harsh, reflecting determination to prevent youth movements 
gaining ground in the city. The first arrests were made during the first public action of Rode Jeugd, 
which involved pasting wall posters on the situation in Indonesia. Besides taking photographs and 
finger prints and keeping the youths overnight in the cell, the police had, according to Wubben, 
informed their employers, “as if we had committed a murder.”18 
Provocative confrontations with the authorities and especially with the police became 
a prevalent aspect of Rode Jeugd’s actions in Eindhoven. It took the form of more or less 
spontaneous teasing of the policemen by shouting things, damaging the police cars or doing 
something to which the police would react but making sure there were just out of reach. That seems 
to have been mostly an enterprise of certain younger members of Rode Jeugd while Henk Wubben 
was rarely seen taking part in these actions. 
Besides the authorities, Rode Jeugd’s adherents frequently ended up in confrontation 
with American soldiers who were based in West Germany and who regularly visited Eindhoven in 
their furlough. These “beer patrols”, as Rode Jeugd called them, came several times to the Rode 
Jeugd stand at the market place to pick a quarrel and destroy the propaganda material. According to 
eye witnesses’ and Rode Jeugd’s own account, the police were not eager to interfere with the 
fighting, which was interpreted as a sign of discrimination against left-wing and progressive 
youths.
19
 The third front of confrontations was at the factory gates. Rode Jeugd youths came often 
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in conflict with security guards when they were delivering pamphlets to the workers who were 
entering the factory terrain.
20
  
From the Rode Jeugd youths’ perspective, it looked like whatever they did, they were 
confronted with countermeasures. To defend its right of existence, Rode Jeugd decided to respond 
to every action taken against them even harder. This soon led to a process of escalation:  
In the morning, confrontation group of Rode Jeugd goes to the [factory] gate to deliver 
pamphlets to the arriving workers with calls such as do not take this, protest, go to 
resistance etc. Then the factory guards come and say, you must go away, you are at the 
territory of the factory [….]. A couple of days later you go back [...]. Away from the 
sight is what was called a strike force. Again the security guards came out to beat us. 
The strike force stormed immediately to the fore and beat the security guards with 
cudgels.  
The next step was that you came back again with the confrontation group and 
strike force to the gates and invite the security guards to come out. [...] If that did not 
help, then we came to the next phase […]. You located the house of the company’s 
director, chalked it, broke the windows and turned his car around.  
These are naturally hard and extreme methods, but other methods did not work 
in Eindhoven. We had to act this way, not only to continue existing as political 
movement but also to enforce our authority. That was thus a culture of violence, an 
institutionalized culture of violence that was used against us in the first instance and 
which we resisted. That way you came to a process where one step provoked another. 
21
 
 
The most famous confrontation of Rode Jeugd with the authorities took place in February 1969. 
Rode Jeugd organized a demonstration against Philips together with Studenten Vakbeweging (SVB, 
Students’ Trade Union Movement)22 under the name Aktiegroep Eindhoven Griekenland (Action 
group Eindhoven Greece). A couple of months earlier, Philips had opened a new factory in Greece 
and which in demonstrators’ opinion indicated that Philips was supporting the US-backed military 
junta that had come to power two years earlier.
23
 Overall, Philips was a manifestation of those 
powers that Rode Jeugd was opposing: imperialism and local establishment of Eindhoven. 
The demonstration reached its climax when the demonstrators, led by Henk Wubben 
and Evert van den Berg (another prominent Rode Jeugd member of Eindhoven in the years to come) 
approached the statue of Anton Philips to lay a wreath made of barbed wired and decorated with a 
swastika.
24
 The police had called the demonstrators to stay away from the statue, and when the 
order was not obeyed, the police dogs were released and allegedly several plainclothes Philips 
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security guards attacked the demonstrators. A couple of days later, the police commissioner 
Odekerken defended his decision in the local newspaper:  
The boundaries must be set somewhere and for me personally it was in front of the statue 
of Dr. A.F. Philips. Dr. Anton Philips has meant a lot to Eindhoven; to prevent this 
statue, his memory being damaged, I consider that I acted sensibly when I gave leave to 
release the dogs.
25
 
 
The demonstration was followed by a wave of reactions that brought Rode Jeugd into national 
awareness.
26
 For Henk Wubben, it cost his job as it turned out that the company he was working for 
was linked to Philips.
27
  
The escalation process between Rode Jeugd and the authorities in Eindhoven 
undoubtedly played a central role in Rode Jeugd’s radicalization. Faced with the ever-escalating 
conflict, its members expected that a similar kind of polarized situation would eventually develop in 
the Netherlands as already had in West Germany and France. That suggested that a change of 
tactics was in place: 
 
The tactics of extraparliamentary actions that Rode Jeugd uses in Eindhoven will 
change significantly and fundamentally. The traditions forms of passive resistance such 
as demonstrations [...] have proven to be insensible and can be considered over. It has 
naive and unrealistic to think in the first place that monopoly capitalism of the 
establishment would be moved by a pamphlet where the disasterious consequences of 
the capitalist system are underlined. [...] We must move from peaceful, sterile protests 
to progressive resistance. [...] It is clear that our tactic [...] has to be waging aggressive 
urban guerrilla war. Possibilities of such guerrilla struggle in the living population 
centers of the west must be studied. [...] The use of proggressive violence against the 
reactionary violence will thus lead to the total reorientation of Rode Jeugd’s purpose, 
methods and ideology.
28
 
 
It was announced that Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven had adopted a new approach called Revolutionaire 
Buitenparlementaire Oppositie (REBO, Revolutionary Extraparliamentary Opposition), modelled 
after the German and French extraparliamentary oppositions. The use of violent tactics was justified 
by drawing a parallel between Rode Jeugd and the guerrilla movements in the Third World. They 
all found themselves in similar kind of situations and were acting as vanguards for the suppressed 
masses.
29
  
After the Philips demonstration, the conflict kept escalating in Eindhoven. This time, 
the major of Eindhoven, Herman Witte became their target. Rode Jeugd accused him from unsavory 
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behavior during the Second World War. In September 1969, his car was hit by an incendiary device 
when he was returning from the opening ceremony of the new city hall. As response, the police 
arrested thirteen youths and made seven of them were made to sign a written commitment that they 
would not take part in political activities for the next six months.
30
 In June 1970, the home of police 
sergeant Piet Snijders, stationed together with two other sergeants to the inner city of Eindhoven, 
seemed to have been the target of a fire bomb attack, although the bomb actually hit the 
neighbouring house. A couple of months afterwards, three local Rode Jeugd members, including 
Henk Wubben, were arrested and held in custody until being acquitted from the original charges, 
most of them related to the aforementioned firebomb attack. Wubben himself was arrested for six 
months.
31
 
 
Split of the moderate wing 
 
While Rode Jeugd kept radicalizing, the protest movement around it was also changing. This had a 
profound impact on Rode Jeugd: 
The year 1970 was important for RJ, and it found its expression in 1971. After 4 years of 
disturbances, during which Rode Jeugd got and kept going well, the movement began to 
ebb away. This happened in 1969 and 1970. With this, also the potential of RJ became 
slowly washed away. What was left were the motivated adherents, a few key members 
and the leaders. Whereas in 1966–1970 violence was used only in the form of stones, 
smoke bombs, cudgels and a few Molotovcocktails, in 1970 began the discussion of 
more serious violence, the development of the “urban guerrilla,” about which little was 
known at that time.
32
 
 
The protest movement, which was largely based on spontaneity, was losing momentum. Instead, 
many of those who had been active in that context started to orient towards established politics. 
Most typically, they joined small parties that had close bonds with the movement or the increasing 
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number of single-issue (peace, environmental etc.) organizations established within it.
33
 This choice 
was made possible by the attitude of the Dutch elite. Towards the mid-1960s, a rather common 
perception among the elite was that the world was changing quickly and it made no sense to fight 
against it.
34
 
For a small minority, which included the core of Rode Jeugd, this cooptation and 
institutionalization was no way to go.
35
 With the ebb of the protest movement, however, Rode Jeugd 
lost a big part of its adherents. What was left were the leaders and the most committed members.
36
  
The new situation intensified the discussion among the core members about the 
group’s future. While spontaneity had had its advantages in the earlier years when a large amount of 
youths were easily mobilized into action, the new circumstances, in the activists’ view, called for 
stricter organization and more serious approach. This was demanded especially by Henk Wubben 
who had never been a big fan of spontaneity. Rode Jeugd put a lot of faith on the working class 
youth to show themselves to be more revolutionary and committed than students.
37
 
 Besides good organization and discipline, a good revolutionary movement needed also 
a clear political program. This turned out to be a particularly tricky question. In the previous years, 
ideas and activities of Rode Jeugd in different cities had developed to different directions and 
several political lines had emerged. While the development of the Eindhoven branch was generally 
met with interest and excitement by Rode Jeugd youths in other cities, but there were also critics.  
Efforts for coherent programme and more structured organization were made already 
in 1969 when the first congress of Rode Jeugd was held. On that occasion, Willem Oskam was 
appointed as Rode Jeugd’s chairman and Henk Wubben and Joost van Steenis as other members of 
the leading troika. Also, a document outlining its principles was put together, but not everyone was 
happy with it.
 38
  
During 1970 and 1971, a fierce dispute developed among Rode Jeugd. The battle 
about the appropriate course of action was waged with the writings of Marxist-Leninist classics as a 
weapon in Rode Jeugd’s internal discussion paper Voorwaarts (Forwards). Opposed to each other 
were the moderates in Amsterdam and Kampen, led by Ton Meurs on one side and the radicals, 
including the whole branch of Eindhoven and most of Rode Jeugd’s leaders, on the other side. The 
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key issue was very typical for the radical left-wing movements of its time: violence
39
 now or only 
later. That violence was necessary to bring up revolution was self-evident to all of them. 
 For the moderates, the best actions of Rode Jeugd were committed around 1969–1970 
in Amsterdam where Rode Jeugd had become active in organizing youths working for the 
supermarket chain Albert Heijn. In those efforts, Rode Jeugd was working along real communist 
lines and not caught in sidetracks like insensible fighting with the authorities.
40
 
In Eindhoven, community work never really found ground. The activities were more 
characterized by direct action and ever-escalating confrontation with authorities. The local Rode 
Jeugd members and most of the organization’s national leaders supported the so-called radical or 
Leninist line. While influenced by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, their ideas came just as much 
from Carlos Marighella, whose manual for urban guerrilla struggle had just been released and being 
published in Rode Jeugd paper in several parts, starting in August 1970. This line was consolidated 
into a single document for the first time by Henk Wubben, but also several other people had a role 
in its development.  
Unlike the moderates, the radicals thought it was not possible to bring the masses into 
power in fully industrialized societies by means of traditional workers organizations. The workers 
had so hopelessly lost their class consciousness that they no longer realized they were being 
exploited. The best way for Rode Jeugd to bring the revolution closer was to act as a vanguard 
organization. By its actions, this vanguard should support the struggle in the Third World by 
attacking capitalist institutions in the Netherlands and that way to escalate the destruction of 
capitalism along the lines of the encirclement theory of Lin Piao
41
. Based on that theory, they 
predicted that revolution would first succeed in Third World countries and then spread to the 
heartlands of capitalism. By driving capitalism into chaos at home they could best help the 
progression of the revolutionary struggle and at the same time demonstrate to the Dutch workers 
how the capitalist system could be effectively attacked. Also, the vanguard would benefit the 
mobilization of the masses in the Netherlands by developing tactics and spreading information so 
that when the time comes to challenge the system, the masses would know what to do.
42
  
The text also established legitimation for violence: 
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With this economic oppression, the owner practices violence against the labour class in 
all forms from physical to mental violence. Breaking free from these circumstances 
requires the take-over of productive means by the proletariat which returns them to the 
society. To achieve this, it is necessary to respond the violence of the ruling class with 
violence. [...] Because violence stems from economical relations and it does not depend 
on any kind of ethical conceptions about freedom or humanity, we must consider 
violence a technical question, a political tool to destroy the adversary. From this 
perspective, the relationship between the objectives and means becomes also a technical 
question. The use of intimidation and terror is necessary in the fight against the private 
interests of the oppressors. [..] Here [in the Netherlands], we are facing the destructive 
phase [of the struggle] and the situation requires from us that we use all possible means 
without reservations to achieve our objective, which at this phase is to drive capitalism 
into chaos. Fraud, intimidation, sabotage, destruction of lives, stratagems and so forth are 
necessary for this purpose. At this phase of the revolution, we must free ourselves from 
all values and norms of the ruling class because these rules are restrict us and they are 
directed at preserving the status quo.
43
  
 
Soon after Wubben’s paper was published, several key leaders of Rode Jeugd were leaving for 
China. It would be a three months’ visit by the invitation of the embassy of China. Ton Meurs, 
demanded that they should not leave. When they decided to leave anyway, the parties agreed on a 
ceasefire: the radicals would refrain from any further action and the moderates would not attack the 
radicals publicly.
44
 
In the meanwhile, the moderates drafted their response to Wubben’s paper. They 
claimed that the interpretation of the revolutionary struggle downright dangerous for the struggle of 
the labour class in the Netherlands. There was no problem with class-consciousness among the 
labour class. Monotonous work in the assembly lines increased it and not destroyed it as Wubben 
has claimed. The first priority at that moment was to organize the workers by working in companies 
and labour unions. Starting the use of violence without the masses would only lead to the 
destruction of the vanguard. They also accused Wubben from misreading Lin Piao’s encirclement 
theory.
45
 
Little came out of the agreed cease-fire. Before the leaders left, it was also agreed 
among the Eindhoven branch that, should there be one more attack against them by the police, they 
would attack the police commissioner himself. Shortly after the leaders had left, a firebomb 
exploded under the car of the police commissioner of Eindhoven. Rode Jeugd claimed the attack.
46
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During the next couple of weeks, the secret headquarters of Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven 
were visited by an army of reporters. In several interviews, anonymous Rode Jeugd members told 
that things had gone so far that there could be deaths and announced group’s responsibility on 
several other deeds.
47
 A weekly paper Vrij Nederland published a full-page interview with a young 
man who was “22 years old and has a long hair” where he told that no legal or moral norms 
restricted them when their struggle to bring down the system.
48
 In another weekly, a member of 
Rode Jeugd told that professional revolutionaries need money and therefore there was a 
expropriation program of a Dutch bank waiting for execution.
49
  
 The attack and the press campaign effectively sealed the split among the organization. 
The moderates responded by publishing a pamphlet where they proclaimed the words and deeds of 
the Eindhoven section as misinterpretations of Marxist-Leninist theory.
50
 The news about the bomb 
attack reached the Rode Jeugd delegation which, on their way back to the Netherlands in early 
October 1971, stepped out of the plane in Brussels and travelled the rest of the way by train, fearing 
that the police would be waiting for them at the airport. While the leaders had argued for the use of 
violence now, they were not totally pleased with what had happened. They did not have any 
complaints about the burning of the police commissioner’s car, but the younger members were 
severely criticized for the press campaign which the leaders found unnecessary and 
counterproductive.
51
 
 The split of Rode Jeugd was sealed in November 1971. The moderates had called up a 
Rode Jeugd congress to sort out the differences. Only two activists supporting the radical line 
showed up, only to announce that all the others had been expelled from the organization. The 
moderates consequently established a short-lived organization called Rode Jeugd (ML).
52
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The resistance phase 
 
After a period of meetings and discussions, the first modest steps towards illegal work 
were taken in 1971. In 1972, these were extended, diverse contacts established and 
experiences were gathered in this terrain that was new for all groups. It brought certain 
danger with it, because there was not much to try out yet.
53
 
 
In the next couple of years, the remaining members of Rode Jeugd were taking steps towards more 
serious and radical ways of action. The term urban guerrilla appeared first in Rode Jeugd paper 
already in 1967. Then it was concluded that it was naturally not possible to start a guerrilla in the 
Netherlands, but that the working class had to show its class solidarity with those people who were 
standing face to face with imperialism or are directly opposing it.
54
 Now, they were of different 
opinion. At the same time, the more radical the group became, the more people left its ranks. 
 Besides the withering of the protest movement at home, the strategy and worldview of 
Rode Jeugd were challenged by some developments abroad. Rode Jeugd had perceived itself as part 
of a worldwide revolutionary movement that was led by China. However, China’s commitment to 
the world revolution came seriously under question in the latter part of 1971 when China started to 
normalize its relations with the United States and announced that President Richard Nixon would 
come to a state visit. Around the same time, Lin Piao, the figurehead of the encirclement theory, 
died in a dubious plane crash. The revolutionary community was there no more (if it ever existed in 
such form as they had envisioned), so Rode Jeugd could not count on any such alliances.
55
 
In the coming months, new lines for the struggle were drafted.
56
 The plan was 
basically to start building up an urban guerrilla organization in the Netherlands with the resources 
they had in hand.  
They did not expect it to be easy: 
We are still a small group and we have to map out our tactic cautiously to avoid that we 
become destroyed before we have achieved our objectives. The first steps will be 
difficult. There will be strong attacks from the right but also from many who call 
themself leftists. We have to convince these leftists by conducting the correct and clear 
politics. From the struggle conducted by Tupamaros, RAF in Germany or NRP in France, 
it has come out that many leftists are against the line of violence. But our politics are 
correct and by following our line consistently and when so-called “leftists” actions fail 
again and again, the majority of the leftists will start to support the line of violence and 
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that we have to start the violent revolutionary struggle now. [...] At first, it will appear 
that we become isolated, but in a longer term our force and support will start to grow 
quickly.
57
 
 
In the internal discussion paper, three things were identified for the urban guerrilla 
organization to do. Firstly, it would prepare for revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands. This 
struggle was not expected to actualize in the near future. In the meanwhile, it would support the 
struggle of people in the Third World by attacking the economic power of the imperialists in the 
Netherlands. Thirdly, contacts would be established with other guerrilla organizations in other West 
European countries. The purpose of the contacts was to provide help and learn from those who had 
more experience with the urban guerrilla. 
The plan included creating an organization with legal and illegal branches. The illegal 
branch should consist of largely autonomous cells that would train themselves through learning-by-
doing and would school themselves further in Marxist-Leninist theories. Besides training and 
recruiting, the cells and the national command should also be involved in putting together the 
necessary material resources for the actions, such as cars and other transportation vehicles and 
weapons. At first, the cells should commit small acts such as chalking, setting cars into fire or 
breaking windows. Later, they could use all kinds of explosives to attack economic and political 
power holders. It was emphasised that at all times, it should be made sure that the public was not 
put into danger.  
While this structure was to be created for committing illegal acts, it was considered 
very important that, to avoid isolation and recruit new members, these professional revolutionaries 
would maintain their normal contacts with the society and be involved in legal activities. To support 
this illegal organisation, a legal mass movement should be put up. This network of sympathisers 
could provide intelligence information, hiding places and other things that the cells need.  
Some experiments with illegal actions were conducted already in 1971. Besides the 
attack against the car of the police commissioner in Eindhoven, Aat van Wijk recalls that there were 
a few unsuccessful bomb attacks, including an attempt for a bomb attack during the state visit of 
Japanese emperor Hirohito. A bomb was placed to the hotel he was staying at, but it failed to 
explode properly.
58
  
In early 1972, the urban guerrilla campaign started for real. The first bomb attack took 
place in February 1972 when a small explosion hit Evoluon, the exhibition center established by 
Philips in Eindhoven. Next morning, a letter signed by Philips Griekenland Aktiegroep (Philips 
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Greece Actiongroup) arrived to the press office of Philips. In the letter, it was told that Philips had 
one month to deliver one million guilders to the Greek resistance movement, otherwise the group 
would start its sabotage program and, if necessary, put the directors of Philips personally 
responsible for their deeds.
59
  
In the media, there was immediately speculation about a link between this action 
group and Rode Jeugd. Rode Jeugd had after all picked Philips as a symbol of imperialism and 
oppression of labor class, held demonstrations against it and delivered pamphlets among its 
workers. Its members had played a significant role in an action group that had earlier voiced a 
similar request on Philips.
60
 The spokesperson of Rode Jeugd denied that the group was responsible 
for the action, but also emphasized that Rode Jeugd did not distance itself from such deeds either.
61
  
During the spring, there were many more small-scale bomb attacks (both successful 
and failed) in Philips facilities, which went unclaimed. On 24 April, bombs exploded in Philips 
facilities in Rotterdam, Baarn and Hilversum.
62
 A month later, there was a bomb attack in the 
Philips facilities in Arnhem and an attempted attack in Amsterdam. In early June, an attempt for 
bomb attacks was made in Philips facility in Eindhoven, but the bomb failed to explode.
63
 These 
attacks were not reported in the media at that time.  
On 8 May, a previously unknown group called Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland 
(RVN, Revolutionary People’s Resistance Netherlands) claimed an arson attempt on the office of 
Turkish Airlines in Amsterdam. It was told that the attack was a protest against the execution of 
three left-wing extremists in Turkey.
64
 On 18 June, another arson attack was made in the name of 
RVN. The target was this time the American Library in Amsterdam and it caused significant 
damage.
65
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Both Philips Griekenland Aktiegroep and Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland were 
action names of Rode Jeugd that were used for illegal actions. In this way, Rode Jeugd could 
remain a legal organization, only covertly supporting illegal actions taken by ad-hoc commandos 
that operated under different names.
66 
Both Aktiegroep Philips Griekenland and Revolutionair 
Volksverzet Nederland were featured in a Rode Jeugd booklet that was published in August 1972. 
Philips Griekenland Actiegroep is portrayed as group acting independently of but according to 
ideological lines set by Rode Jeugd. What comes to Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland, it is told 
that it had recently been established by a group of people from Marxist-Leninist movements with 
the intention of building up an organization capable of committing illegal acts and to prepare for the 
armed struggle.
67
  
 In October, the name of Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland appeared in the 
headlines again in the context of a series of attacks that caused a lot of alarm. The first attack took 
place at Holiday Inn in Utrecht on 4 October. A couple of weeks later, there were several attempted 
or successful bomb attacks within days from each other. The targets of these attacks were Bank of 
America in Rotterdam, Zwolsche Algemeene (which was owned by the gigantic American company 
ITT) and one of the former top executives of Philips in Eindhoven.
68
 The bombs were largely 
similar to each other and much more professional than the ones that were used in bomb attacks 
against Philips in the spring.
 
They bore resemblance with some bombs used by RAF in West 
Germany.
69
 These successive attempts for bomb attacks caused a lot of hysteria. In latter part of 
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The police concluded almost immediately that the attacks must be the work of a 
domestic organization.
71
 Again, there was a lot of speculation about Rode Jeugd’s responsibility.72 
More light to the attacks came on 21 October when several newspapers reported that a letter was 
received by the media from Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland: 
Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland is responsible for the attacks on Holiday-Inn 
Utrecht, Bank of Amerika R’dam and Z.A. [Zwolsche Algemeen] Utrecht. The attacks 
are directed against the U.S. imperialism in Vietnam and Chile in particular. One 
should not expect us to distribute pamphlets any more. The struggle will be fought with 
weapons. Down with all American companies in the Netherlands. Long live the armed 
uprising. Venceremos.
73
  
 
Another letter signed by RVN was received by the top executives of Philips:  
Despite several exhortations, the executive board has not found it necessary to accept 
our request. Therefore, the tribunal has decided to go into the next phase of the action 
program. The last warning has been given. From now on, there will be proceeded to 
direct personal action. The tribunal has valued you personally at 48 000 guilders. 
Should you not pay, then the action group will apply the last phase to you or your 
surroundings. If you accept our suggestions, we expect you to place the attached 
advertisement on 26/10 or 27/10 or 28/10. Then, the action group knows that you want 
to accept the suggestions and will contact you in due time to arrange the transaction 
with you. In return, the tribunal will call off personal acts against you and your 
surroundings.
 74
 
 
One day later, yet another letter signed by RVN reached the newspapers. In that letter, RVN denied 
its responsibility and announced that it had not sent the earlier letter. Instead, it was claimed that the 
whole campaign was a stunt of right-wing elements in the Netherlands aimed at turning people 
against the left-wing groups in the eve of the elections.75 Later, it has come out that this letter was 
written by those involved in RVN to confuse the police and judiciary.
76
 
Until now, other left-wing organisations had felt little need discussing the doings of 
Rode Jeugd in their publications. After the bomb attacks in October, however, the competing 
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Marxist-Leninist organization KEN (ml) published an article on the bomb attacks in its newspaper 
Rode Tribune. Rode Jeugd was accused of false revolutionary politics and called anarchist-terrorists 
who endanger the real revolutionary struggle by their childish actions. The authorities are blamed 
for using Rode Jeugd to discredit the whole revolutionary movement and legitimize the 
development of stricter counterterrorist measures.
77
 In Vrije Socialist, a publication of an anarchist 
group Federatie van Vrije Socialisten, it is suspected that the attacks were work of right-wing 
forces. How else could one explain why all bombs were so visibly placed, almost none of them 
went off and no organisation has claimed and explained the attacks?
78
 
The authorities seemed to be sure that the attacks were committed by Rode Jeugd 
members but there was no definite evidence against any particular person.
79 
Because the question of 
responsibility for the attacks remained without any definite answers, there was room for 
speculations in the lines of the last letter signed by RVN.
80
 Rode Jeugd, on its part, announced that 
it was not responsible for any of the bombs and did not know whether RVN was responsible, but 
that this kind of acts got their sympathies.
81
 Later in December 1972, Willem Oskam admitted in an 
interview that there were people from Rode Jeugd in the ranks of Revolutionair Volksverzet 
Nederland.
82
 
 While Rode Jeugd was behind RVN and PGAG (and most probably also most of the 
unclaimed bomb attacks against Philips), not everyone active in Rode Jeugd were up to date with at 
least the practical side of illegal activities. The organization was divided into legal and illegal parts, 
even though some people involved with illegal acts also took part in schoolings and other legal 
actions. Those involved in the illegal activities included at least Joost van Steenis, Henk Wubben, 
Aat van Wijk and Willem Oskam (who was sometimes left in the dark for the fear of him not being 
able to keep things secret). Also Luciën van Hoesel and Theo Engelen, both central figures of the 
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Eindhoven branch, were often involved.
83
 Besides them, there was at least Jan Mölling, a Rode 
Jeugd member from Amsterdam who was a smith by profession, helped them with making the 
jackets for the bombs.
84
 
During 1972, preparations were going on for the executions and support of the urban 
guerrilla struggle. Weapons were bought and plans were made for obtaining money through bank 
robberies and renting safe houses. There were also renewed efforts for political schooling.
85
 
However, just as the urban guerrilla started to get off the ground a bit, some worrying developments 
took place. In West Germany, most of what later became known as the first generation of RAF had 
become arrested and some of its members got killed by the police. If an organization like RAF, 
which was much larger and more sophisticated, could not survive, what would be Rode Jeugd’s 
chances? If we know that we would not be able to hold up for more than a very short time, does it 
make any sense to start with it at all? These were questions that many Rode Jeugd key members 
pondered. 
  
Decline of Rode Jeugd 
 
After the bomb attacks, the authorities feared for more attacks and felt a need to take action against 
Rode Jeugd.
86
 In December 1972, the police raided the houses of three Rode Jeugd activists. Two of 
them were released quickly, but with the third one, Luciën van Hoesel, things were more 
complicated. Under his bed, boxes with bomb supplies similar to those used in recent bomb attacks 
were found. Everything suggested that the authorities must have had an information source inside 
the group.  
The members fervently tried to hunt down the traitors among their ranks and 
organized support for Luciën van Hoesel’s upcoming trial. For this latter purpose, they took part in 
establishing an organization called Rode Hulp (in English Red Help). The task of this organization 
was to support so-called political prisoners, especially Luciën van Hoesel, but also imprisoned RAF 
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members and Palestinians. At the same time, they continued their activities as before and planned 
new bomb attacks. In March 1973, when Van Hoesel’s trial started, Rode Jeugd threatened public 
prosecutor J. Peijnenburg with revenge if Van Hoesel was sentenced. Also Philips was warned.
87
 
Then in June 1973, Ger Flokstra, a less prominent Rode Jeugd member, was arrested 
with a suitcase full of bomb supplies. The bomb was meant to be used in an attack against an 
American target similar to those that had been committed in October. Also this time, it was obvious 
that there was an informant involved. According to a police document, Rode Jeugd would have 
come up with a plan to commit several bomb attacks to strengthen the position of van Hoesel. The 
police had followed Flokstra when he brought the bomb materials in a suitcase from Amsterdam to 
Eindhoven and stored them to a locker at the train station. When he came came back to collect the 
suitcase, he was arrested.
88
 
While Rode Jeugd people recovered rather quickly from the initial shock caused by 
the arrest of Luciën van Hoesel, the arrest of Ger Flokstra paralyzed the group. It was a well-known 
fact that there were informants inside the group. These arrests, however, managed to plant a 
considerable degree of suspicion and almost paranoia among them. Questions about trust and what 
to do with people they suspected of being informants sucked up all energy.
89
 
Rode Jeugd activists of course knew that they were under close scrutiny by the security 
service and they had spotted informants among their ranks already in the late 1960s. It was also 
clear that if they wanted to commit to urban guerrilla struggle, they should be to work disciplined 
enough to keep their plans secret. The organization, however, remained still very open, and outer 
rings of the group were easily infiltrated by the security agencies. Each cell operated rather 
autonomously, and it was difficult to keep everything under control. This was not too threatening as 
long as all confidential information stayed within the core group. The real problem was that while 
most core members developed high security awareness, there were some who had trouble resisting 
the temptation to share confidential information over a glass of beer.
90
  
Rode Jeugd, and especially Henk Wubben, put much effort into developing 
counterintelligence measures. Some of the informers for example, were exposed or outed 
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themselves, and were instructed to feed the BVD false information in return.
91
 BVD ”runners” were 
deceived by providing them with the same false piece of information through several informants, 
thereby increasing its credibility. In other cases, Rode Jeugd publicly exposed the informers, 
thereby embarrassing the BVD.
92
 
The issues of infiltration gained a prominent role also in the trial of Luciën van 
Hoesel. He initially got a sentence of three years for the possession of explosives which was an 
exceptionally long term for such crime. Van Hoesel did not accept this verdict and appealed to a 
higher court. At this stage, his attorney, Pieter Herman Bakker Schut and Rode Jeugd members 
made an attempt to cast doubt over the evidence that formed basis for Van Hoesel’s sentence. They 
did this by exposing the details about one case where the BVD had used an informant in an attempt 
to incriminate another Rode Jeugd member. Danny Mulders, one of the less prominent young 
members of Rode Jeugd had come clean about his contacts with BVD after his runner had allegedly 
provided him with money to buy a pistol and return it with Evert van den Berg’s finger prints on it. 
An official BVD history claims that Van den Berg himself instigated it and that Mulders surprised 
his runner with the gun.
93
 Be as it may, the issue was deeply embarrassing for the BVD. It did not 
turn the sentence of Van Hoesel, however. He received a sentence of two years in November 1973. 
During the fall 1973, it was becoming increasingly evident to people in Rode Jeugd 
that it was time for some drastic changes. It was at this point that the history of Rode Jeugd, quoted 
several times above, was written. The history ended followingly: 
It is clear that we all have still a lot to learn. There is no room for carelessness that can 
lead to blunders and bring the comrades and organization in danger.
94
 
 
The members kept on analysing the international situation and the learnings from other 
revolutionary movements to decide what they should do. There was no question that the revolution 
would come but they clearly felt that the strategy of urban guerrilla needed to be defined better. The 
symbolic bombings against imperialist targets were still found productive and all in all, they 
remained steadfast in their belief that revolution was not possible without violence. Any 
revolutionary organization that wanted to be successful, should have not only a strong legal arm but 
also an illegal arm to be able to defend itself. In fact, the recent example of Chile had proven that 
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very point once again. There were no grounds to think that it would be otherwise in Europe. In 
Germany, the whole left was under pressure and a couple of hundred people had been arrested, in 
Belgium, newspapers and books were banned, workers on strike were intimidated and fired. In 
France, a number of left-wing organisations had been banned and in Italy the police and fascist 
gangs were cooperating. The same trend has taken place in the Netherlands too, the establishment 
of “terrorist brigades” being one example of them. Therefore, it was necessary to start with building 
the illegal side of the revolutionary struggle also in the Netherlands.
95
  
What came to the legal arm of the struggle, it was concluded that they could not 
develop such political organization from Rode Jeugd that could take up this task: 
Rode Jeugd is organizationally not up to a long-lasting struggle in the metropolises, not 
well adjusted to the reality of waging armed anti-imperialist struggle and class struggle. 
It is therefore unavoidable that we have to remodel our organization. The image of 
Rode Jeugd that is formed through several years’ practice does not go together with the 
level in which we need to start working. It can even be that this image hinders the 
building of a resistance organization in the Netherlands.
96
 
 
 The organization was formerly disbanded on 14 March 1974, the anniversary of the death of Karl 
Marx: 
The national command of Rode Jeugd has decided to disband Rode Jeugd as a legal 
political organization. The formation of sharpshooter brigades whose task is to kill, the 
establishment of the National Criminal Investigation Service for so-called ideological 
criminality and increasingly stronger calls of the police corps from big cities to widen 
the repression apparatus are seriously threatening Rode Jeugd’s normal way of 
functioning. […] As Rode Jeugd refuses to be voluntarily experimented on or to serve 
as a target for the rising fascism any longer, the national command has decided to 
disband its legal status.
97
 
 
In this press release, the need to disband Rode Jeugd is largely explained by the hardened counter-
measures. In the texts written by Rode Jeugd members
98
 for more restricted consumption, the 
stagnation of theory forming was blamed for the miserable state of urban guerrilla in the 
Netherlands. Because of that, same old mistakes had been made over and over again. The problem 
with most Marxist-Leninists was, in Rode Jeugd activists’ view that they stubbornly and 
uncritically held to the mass line and strived for building up a mass organization. They did not have 
an understanding of the structure and development of imperialism in the global level and 
requirements that it set for the struggle. While focusing on the legal organization, they ignored the 
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importance of building an illegal organization on its side to help it prevail the countermeasures by 
the capitalist and imperialist forces. In this situation, Rode Jeugd more than any other organization 
had wiped out the dust from the old classics and dared to bring up the question of violence. 
 To put it simply, Rode Jeugd lacked supporters. Its relations with other Marxist-
Leninist organisations had always been troublesome. Movements such as Bond van Nederlandse 
Marxisten-Leninisten
99
 and KEN ml did show support when someone from Rode Jeugd was 
arrested and criticized the authorities for the way they attacked the left
100
, but that was how far their 
solidarity went. 
The second problem, specific to Rode Jeugd, concerned organization. The problem 
was that when it was decided to move from protest to resistance, the organization had not changed 
accordingly. The purpose had been to build up a resistance organization with well-schooled 
revolutionaries capable of consistent and disciplined action. However, many of its adherents were 
young workers who acted spontaneously out of their dissatisfaction with the societal situation and 
did not care for ideological schooling. Also for the more experienced and motivated members had 
problems adapting to the new situation. The result was an organization with initiatives for 
resistance, but still characterized by spontaneity and openness.
101
 
 The lack of schooling was seen also as an obstacle in the further development of their 
own organization because they made it difficult to recruit new supporters or allies, especially 
among the intellectuals. It was mentioned that the low theoretical level was one reason why some 
people, especially intellectuals, did not want to work with Rode Jeugd.
102
 This showed a shift in 
Rode Jeugd members’ thinking. Rode Jeugd had been distinctively a working class movement. Its 
members had been suspicious at best about the leftist students who went to the factories to learn 
about the life of workers while young workers like they themselves tried their everything to get out 
of there.  
 While things had gone awry with the revolutionary struggle, it was no reason to quit. 
It was however, only a handful of core members who continued the efforts while the rest quietly left 
the scene. 
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New attempts for revolutionary armed struggle 
 
In reality, the disbandment of Rode Jeugd did not bring any big change to many of its key 
members’ activities. In the resistance phase of Rode Jeugd, key members had already functioned in 
many ways rather autonomously and hardly anyone had a concise overview of everything that was 
going on. After the disbandment, many of them simply went on like before with their own network 
of people and activities. The relations between the key members had become strained to the degree 
that it was felt best everybody went their own way. Some stayed in contact, but others took 
distance.  
The next couple of years were characterized by search for ways to matter for 
revolutionary struggle. Starting up an urban guerrilla in the Netherlands was still in the agenda, but 
due to increasingly unpromising perspectives, many former Rode Jeugd activists leaned more and 
more towards supporting other armed struggles. Generally, there was the feeling that while 
motivation was still there, there were little possibilities for action. They were all so well known to 
the BVD by then that it was hard to do anything without the agency being aware of it in no time. 
Support to other movements had been an important part of their activities almost from 
the beginning. From the late 1960s on, together with other people in the Netherlands, they had 
provided logistic support for Greek and Portuguese resistance movements and helped, with German 
activists, American soldiers who did not want to go to Vietnam, to escape from the army bases in 
West Germany to Scandinavia. When the preparations for urban guerrilla started in early 1970s, the 
contacts with German activists intensified. Later in the 1970s, Rode Jeugd key members have 
claimed to have provided support for German activists, but the extent of their activities is not 
clear.
103
 Rode Hulp members sent all kinds of supplies to imprisoned activists and helped them with 
legal issues by contacting lawyers. Some of the former Rode Jeugd activists have claimed that they 
have assisted German activists in obtaining explosives and guns, and provided safe houses in the 
Netherlands. There is evidence that at least a dozen fugitive members of the RAF stayed in the 
Netherlands. Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp members might have been involved in providing support.
104
  
Besides that, there is some evidence of attempts in the mid-1970s to help IRA with 
getting weapons.
105
 Some people, like Luciën van Hoesel, as well as Mirjam Lucassen and Annie 
Westebring, who became active in the “Rode Jeugd” corner of the radical left around this time, 
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played with the idea of taking it one step further and leave for Nicaragua or some other place where 
there were better perspectives for revolutionary struggle.
106
 
 
Rode Hulp 
 
Several people from the old cadre of Rode Jeugd joined an organization called Rode Hulp (Red 
Help). As it was already mentioned, this organization was established in January 1973 to organize 
solidarity with progressive activists who because of their activities against the capitalist society had 
already come or threatened to come in conflict with the society.
107
 Instead of merely joining, the 
former Rode Jeugd members rather kidnapped Rode Hulp to use it as a legal cover to continue the 
efforts towards starting an urban guerrilla. This displeased many original members of Rode Hulp 
who soon established their own short-lived organization Rood Solidariteitsfront (Red Solidarity 
Front).
108
  
The former Rode Jeugd members who joined Rode Hulp included Aat van Wijk and 
Willem Oskam but especially Evert van den Berg and Luciën van Hoesel (after he was released 
from prison in late 1974 and moved to Amsterdam) became radical Rode Hulp’s central figures. 
They were joined by new people, most importantly Annie Westebring
109
, who became the secretary 
of Rode Hulp. Also Joost van Steenis was active in these circles, but was later expelled. Willem 
Oskam, although hanging around, remained more on the sidelines. For a long time, he worked in a 
progressive bookstore. In the years to come, the disappointment with the ever-gloomier perspectives 
for revolution seemed to hit this die-had leftist very hard.
110
 
Under the banner of Rode Hulp, a lot of discussions were held about the future of 
revolutionary struggle and the role of the Dutch activists in it. What came to concrete radical 
actions in the form of bomb attacks and the like, not much happened. In May 1976, after the death 
of the RAF leader Ulrike Meinhof, there was a strong urge to do something. A bomb was placed in 
the office of Autopon, which was the main dealer of Volkswagen in the Netherlands. A bomb threat 
call was made to the police in Amsterdam. The bomb was found before it exploded. There appears 
to have been also another attempted bomb attack that targeted a German company called 
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Hoechst.
111
 Several people from the Netherlands travelled to Meinhof’s funeral and some of them 
gave a speech over his grave.
112
 
In the summer 1976, a new opportunity presented itself for the radicals around Rode 
Hulp. There was a chance to participate in a month-long training at the training camp of the 
Palestinian resistance organization PFLP
113
 in South Yemen. The opportunity was arranged by 
Ciska and Adrie Eeken. The couple felt sympathy for the Palestinian cause and was involved in 
various kinds of support activities.
114
  
The group that eventually left for South Yemen was gathered by Evert van den Berg, 
Luciën van Hoesel and Annie Westebring. The offer to accept fifteen people for the training was 
incredibly royal considering the small number of people in the Netherlands that were interested in 
such possibility. Most of those few who were interested were monitored so closely by the security 
service that it was difficult for them to do anything without it being noticed. After a great deal of 
hesitation, it was decided to accept the offer and try to fill all places, because such an opportunity 
did not present itself too often.
115
 
 The list of people who left included Evert van den Berg, Luciën van Hoesel and his 
girlfriend Mirjam Lucassen. Adrie and Ciska Eeken enrolled to the training too, as did Annie 
Westebring and her boyfriend Roel Koopmans. Besides them, there were Lidwien Janssen and 
Rinus Nieuwburg from the network of Evert van den Berg in Breda, two other couples active in the 
radical leftist milieu, a Moluccan called Sam Pormes, recruited through Annie Westebring and an 
Irishman Flinton Vallery from People’s Democracy invited by Evert van den Berg.116 
 The fifteen people who left for South Yemen did not form any homogeneous group. 
Each of them had their own agendas and came from different backgrounds. In an attempt to bring 
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more cohesion into the group, a lengthy document
117
 was produced, with Evert van den Berg and 
Luciën van Hoesel probably as its primary authors, and signed by all travelers. The document was 
largely a summary of the Rode Jeugd ideology. The basic idea was to start building up logistics and 
organization in order to conduct revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands and support struggles 
elsewhere in the world. This was, however, only one of the agendas that the participants had in 
mind.
118
 
The training turned out to be a typical guerrilla training, including long days of 
gymnastic exercises, combat training, shooting and explosives training.
119 
In the camp, there was 
also a group of Germans who seemed to have been there already for longer time who at times acted 
as co-instructors. The group was led by Siegfried Haag. Besides him, also Günther Sonnenberg, 
Verena Becker, Rolf Clemens Wagner, Rolf Heissler, Willy Peter Stoll and Elisabeth van Dyck 
were reportedly there. While the Dutch did not know all of their identity during the training, Luciën 
van Hoesel recognized Elisabeth van Dyck whom he had met in Amsterdam when she was hiding 
there. When Van Hoesel brought that up, he was confronted by the whole German delegation for 
this security blunder, which in their eyes seemed like another addition to the list of amateurish 
deeds of the Dutch comrades.
120
 
While the Dutch activists felt a lot of sympathy for their German comrades and had 
provided help for them, there had always been some ambivalence about the methods used by the 
German urban guerrillas. The experiences with the Germans in the camp fed into that. The RAF 
people irritated the Dutch because they seemed to think they knew it all better and showed how the 
revolution should be done. The relations were further colored by the historical hatred that the Dutch 
felt against the Germans. The RAF people, on their part, paid back by acting very haughtily towards 
the Dutch.
121
 
Instead of a new beginning, the South Yemen episode marked the beginning of the 
end. In retrospect, Evert van den Berg has concluded that all ingredients for disbandment were there 
before the travel, but it took a while to realize it.
122
 
The whole trip to South Yemen was full of security blunders. Making such a journey 
clandestinely while being so closely watched by the security service was quite a challenge to begin 
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with. The participants were aware of that, but the eagerness to leave overcame the concerns for 
security.
123
 The participants made the situation even worse with their own actions. For the travel 
arrangements, they used regular travel agencies, which noticed a sudden increase of queries for 
alternative travel routes to South Yemen. Evert van den Berg’s retrospective statement in 2005 that 
“we could have just as well rented a tourist bus”124 is hardly an exaggeration. Also, it did not help 
that Ciska Eeken travelled with a collection of passport photos of all the participants to the Middle 
East before their travel and that these photos were found and copied by security guards at the 
Schiphol airport in Amsterdam.
125
  
The second compromise was made with the recruitment of participants. It was largely 
based on “who wants, can come” principle. The biggest mistake was, according to the participants, 
that people were allowed to take their boyfriends and girlfriends with them. Besides bringing a 
sufficient degree of social drama with it, the selection process produced a very heterogeneous group 
of people.
126
 
 When accepting such an offer as the training was, it was evident that the time might 
come to return the favor. This came shortly afterwards. Ciska Eeken got a request from Wadi 
Haddad of PFLP to inspect the arrangements on board in an Air France flight to Tel Aviv. 
Originally, Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen were supposed to go, but cancelled, because 
they were afraid they were too well-known to go through passport controls without being 
recognized. In the end, it came down to Rinus Nieuwburg and Lidwien Janssen to carry out the 
assignment. They boarded the flight in Paris on 24 September 1976. Lidwien Janssen left the plane 
in Tel Aviv where the plane made an intermediate landing and Rinus Nieuwburg traveled to the end 
destination, New Delhi.
127
 
When Janssen arrived to Tel Aviv, she was told that the authorities had been informed 
that there was a bomb in her suitcase. After the inspection, she was directed to the airport police 
where a representative of Mossad came to question her.
128
 It soon became clear that Mossad was 
well informed about her past activities. According to Lidwien Janssen, it seemed that it was mostly 
PFLP and not really Rode Hulp that interested the authorities, even though they seemed to be very 
well informed about the latter too.
129
 Her case was handled in the court in early 1977. In March, she 
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was sentenced to six years for indictment, espionage and help to a hostile organization. She was 
released three years after the arrest.
130
 
 After Janssen had left the plane, Rinus Nieuwburg flew the whole way to New Delhi 
as planned and continued his travel unhindered to Bombay. Later, he went to the airport to meet 
Janssen as was agreed in advance and got arrested. The arrest put him in a difficult situation. There 
was no extradition treaty between India and Israel and hardly any evidence to press charges against 
him. Returning to the Netherlands was difficult, because he did not have enough money and airline 
companies were not particularly keen to have someone suspected of planning a plane hijack as their 
passenger. With the help of other Rode Hulp activists, a deal was negotiated with a Dutch journalist 
that in return for arranging Nieuwburg’s travel to the Netherlands, Nieuwburg would give an 
interview.
131
 
 Before the interview was published in November 1976, the arrest of Lidwien Janssen 
as well as the training in South Yemen had already received extensive coverage in the Dutch media. 
Right after the arrest of Nieuwburg, there was a small story in a newspaper about a Dutchman 
arrested in Bombay. For Rode Hulp activists, that was the first sign that the operation did not go as 
planned. Confirmation for this came when early in the following morning, the police showed up on 
the door of the Rode Hulp activists and made house searches.
132
 
 In this situation, there seemed to be only one thing to do. On 31 December 1976, the 
disbandment of Rode Hulp was announced. Just like when Rode Jeugd was disbanded, the actions 
of the authorities were mentioned as a cause for the decision. It was claimed that the criminalization 
politics of the Dutch government and the “bourgeois” media had greatly impeded Rode Hulp’s 
work as a relief agency. It was also pointed that these instances were influenced by the Israeli secret 
service and propaganda machination, which wished to label Rode Hulp a terrorist organization.
133
 
Another wave of operations against the Dutch activists took place in January 1977, 
most evidently prompted by confessions of Lidwien Janssen in Israel.
134
 The operation was so 
extravagant that it must have been organized to work also as a deterrent. It does not seem out of the 
question that pressure from Israel to act firmly against people suspected of cooperating with its 
adversaries played a role as well.
135
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The tour-de-force was largely unnecessary, because most of the trainees and their 
accomplices had already drawn their conclusions. With the ever-increasing attention by the security 
services and experiences with the training, the contemplations about the possibilities and 
expediency of urban guerrilla had reached a culmination point. Luciën van Hoesel told the 
reporters, already before Rode Hulp was disbanded, that it was high time for him to take distance 
from armed struggle.
136
  
For some, one reason for this was the experiences in South Yemen. The training put 
them face-to-face with the reality of armed struggle much more concretely than they had been 
before which made some of them feel uncomfortable. Lidwien Janssen has told that only there she 
realized how much the weapons were the last option and how weapons give a false feeling of 
power. She spoke about this with the Germans in the camp who told that once you use weapons, 
you realize that you won’t become thirty.137 According to Mirjam Lucassen, when she and Luciën 
were training with the weapons in the camp, they did not really think that they would use the skills 
against other people. Only after the training, the consequences of full-fledged involvement in the 
armed struggle started to sink in. To continue with the armed struggle would mean they should put 
their acquired skills in practice. This was too much for them.
138
  
The explanations that those who were active in the radical Rode Hulp have given to their 
detachment from armed struggle have most often included two elements: continuing of the armed 
struggle became impossible because the security service was too well up-to-date with their activities 
and the liberal climate crumbled away motivation. With the withdrawal, also the contacts between 
the former comrades quietly faded away. 
In the case of Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen, the long process of disengagement 
crystallized in a particular moment. In a nightly bus ride to home during the fall of 1976, Luciën 
and she sat in the last bench and agreed that they should stop altogether with what they had been 
doing in the past years. They decided try out something completely different for a while, and maybe 
try again the armed struggle after a couple of years. 
139
 
Shortly after the bus ride, Van Hoesel and Lucassen got married, moved to Groningen in the 
north of the Netherlands and started a family. What comes to the political activities, that 
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“completely different” became joining a political party, Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (PSP, 
Pacifist Socialist Party). The decision has been later explained by Mirjam Lucassen followingly: 
We had always been in the same lines with PSP with regard to how economy should be 
organized, how the society should be organized, you name it. Only the armed struggle 
was somewhat contradictory, because PSP was pacifist and we were just the opposite. 
But if you come to the point that you decide to stop with the armed struggle, then is that 
last difference [...] gone. That was then the only party that came into question. [...] I 
think what has also played a role is that we thought that if we joined a political party, 
then we would be safer, then you were part of something. You can of course start up 
something yourself, but nobody will believe you and you continue to be placed in that 
same corner.
140
  
 
For the PSP, letting former urban guerrilla fighters to join was apparently no problem. In the local 
elections of 1978, Luciën van Hoesel was the leading candidate of PSP and got elected.
141
 In his 
own opinion, his past has only helped him in his career as social worker. As Lucassen has later told, 
it made it easier for Van Hoesel to win the trust of those youths he worked with. Ironically enough, 
his job brought him again face to face with the same prosecutor that was involved in the lawsuit that 
brought Van Hoesel his prison sentence.
142
 
Also Evert van den Berg joined PSP around the same time and has been active in the 
parliamentary context ever since. “A political animal does not stop”, as he put it. It has cost him 
time and energy to make his way and win the respect of everyone, but the fact that it has succeeded, 
has been a proof in his eyes that the return to the society was still possible.
143
 Together with another 
former Rode Jeugd activist Theo Engelen, he was a representative in the agglomeration council in 
Eindhoven in the early 1980s. While both of them had at that point left their revolutionary past 
behind, the security service was not convinced about this and recruited people to monitor them. 
This became public when the recruited informants told about the operation to Evert van den Berg.
144
 
In 1986, Van den Berg was elected to the city council of Eindhoven and in 1994–1998, he worked 
as a policy maker of the parliamentary faction of parties propagating the interest of elderly people. 
Nowadays, he assists representatives of local council in Eindhoven in policy-making. From time to 
time, his past has been brought up. “If you are 35 years active in the politics, you naturally make 
some enemies”.145 
Like Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen, also Annie Westebring left Amsterdam 
and moved to Groningen. She found a new political home, much more rewarding and comfortable 
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than the militant radical left had ever been, in the anarchist movement. Unlike the Marxist-Leninist 
movements, the anarchist movement, in her opinion, acknowledged the diversity of human beings 
and the richness that it brings to the life. She became active in many kind of grassroot activities and 
runned an anarchist bookstore for some time. Over the years, she has worked as a teacher and a chef 
and nowadays she is involved in the education of challenging children through giving them lessons 
in cooking.
146
  
 While leaving the armed struggle behind appears to have been rather easy and smooth 
in practice, it did not happen in the blink of an eye, however. None of those involved were sought 
by the police or had any other such practical issues complicating the detachment. For Evert van den 
Berg, “stopping was one thing, dissolving another issue”. He told it took a long time from him to 
look after people in his network and make sure they would not do the same mistakes again.
147
 It 
also seems that for many it took a long time to process the meaning of their experiences and the 
choice to abandon the idea of armed struggle. 
Not everyone, however, stopped involvement in the armed struggle in 1976. One of 
those who continued was Aat van Wijk. After Rode Jeugd, he was active in the context of Rode 
Hulp, mostly in the form of helping imprisoned German activists by sending goods and speaking 
with lawyers. He did not leave for South Yemen, but was asked by Evert van den Berg and Luciën 
van Hoesel to provide logistical support for their group after they had returned to home.
148
  
When Rode Hulp was disbanded, he continued for a while in Rood Verzetsfront (RVF, 
Red Resistance Front), an organization that was established shortly afterwards (more about the 
organization in the below). Later, Aat van Wijk left the organization, because it became clear that 
the activities of RVF were developing along the same lines as those of Rode Jeugd and Rode Hulp 
earlier. Van Wijk was not interested in making the same mistake for the third time. After criticizing 
the developments, he and his associates from The Hague were kicked out the organization.
149
 
 While leaving RVF behind was an easy choice to make, leaving the whole concept of 
armed struggle was a much more emotional and difficult issue: 
You have ideals, you have ideas, regardless of whether those are good ideals or good 
ideas. We thought for a long time that we, together with other groups in Europe, could 
bring on the revolution. You had lost your sense of reality a bit, okay, but that was your 
vision, that was your point of view. If you discover that it is not true, it is like cutting 
your umbilical cord or so, a painful feeling.
150
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After leaving RVF, Aat van Wijk has had contacts with people in the extraparliamentary left-wing 
scene, but has not been politically active himself. For the next fifteen years, he was so sick of 
everything to do with the politics that he did not even vote in elections. Later, he has regained his 
interest in the politics, but he had made a conscious decision not to take part in any party or 
movement in order to avoid the situation that it would be brought into discredit by revelations that 
there is an “ex-terrorist” among their ranks.151 For a long time, he worked as graphic artist and 
nowadays he runs a cultural centre and a restaurant. 
 
 
Rood Verzetsfront  
 
When Rode Hulp was pronounced dead, a new organization called Rood Verzetsfront (RVF) was 
established. The driving forces behind its establishment were Ciska and Adrie Eeken and a few of 
their acquiantances from the Palestine committee. Those who got involved were mostly people who 
had had ties with Rode Hulp but not active in it. From former core Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp 
members, only Aat van Wijk - and more discreetly Henk Wubben (more about him in the following 
section) - continued their activities in its context. They were joined by a new generation of activists, 
at least some of them radicalized by the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer by RAF in 
September-October 1977.
 152
 
The purpose of Rood Verzetsfront was to support those who opposed the fascist 
system. This was to be done mostly in two ways: to give publicity to resistance against the system 
and to help activists in trouble. For the first purpose, a paper named after the organization was 
established and printed in the Eekens’ own press. Rood Verzetsfront was also actively involved in 
organizing information evenings and demonstrations in support of anti-fascist and anti-imperialist 
movements.
153
 In practice, its activities concentrated heavily on the conflict between the state and 
urban guerrilla groupings in West Germany. Attention for the German situation was sought also by 
methods of direct action. To give an example, in March 1979 RVF occupied the office of Swiss Air 
in Amsterdam as a protest against the treatment of two Bewegung 2. Juni (2nd of June Movement) 
members, who were imprisoned in Switzerland.
154
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 In analogy with Rode Jeugd and Rode Hulp earlier, there seems to have been 
initiatives for armed struggle also behind the façade of Rood Verzetsfront. About these initiatives, 
little concrete is known. Paul Moussault, a former core member of RVF tells in his book about the 
group that in the sprin of 1979, a grouping called B-group was established within the RVF. The  
purpose of this group would have been to start preparing for an armed struggle in teh Netherlands 
by obtaining the necessary resources (such as money, cars, weapons and explosives). According to 
Moussault’s account, which is evidently mostly based on his own recollections, at times supported 
by interviews with other former members, the group drafted several plans for stealing money and 
cars, some of which were aborted only in the last minute. The group also hit twice to the city house 
of Groningen with the intention of obtaining legitimation papers.
155
 After the first such action in 
June 1979, two RVF members became arrested. This action led to a controversy among the RVF 
members about whether the RVF should be involved in such activities in the first place. As 
consequence, several people broke away from the group.
156
 
In these attempts, RVF seems to have confronted the same challenges that Rode 
Jeugd, Rode Hulp and many other groupings with aspiration to armed struggle had confronted 
earlier: how to combine legal and illegal actions.
157
 Many thought that, in order to be successful, the 
branch committing illegal actions should be clearly separated from the legal branch. In the case of 
all of these organizations, there was no patience and resources to create such an illegal branch. 
Besides, many people involved were already well-known so the possibilities for clandestine action 
were not very good. At the same time, crave for action was so big that it was very difficult not to act 
against one’s best judgment. This dilemma was not properly solved inside the organization.158 
For the remaining members, the treatment of the imprisoned RVF member Joop Bolt 
became a focus of their attention. Activities around his case sulminated in a bomb attack against the 
house of J. M. Schampers in late February 1980. The attack was claimed under the name of Rood 
Volksverzet and it was the first bomb attack that the B-group had committed.
159
 
The existence of B-group remained shortlived. By late 1980, its members had 
developed such internal disagreements that made it impossible to continue cooperation. The same 
can be said about the Rood Verzetsfront in general. Cooperation between its branches in various 
cities declined and its members put their efforts mostly in working in the context of militant squatter 
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movement, anti-militarism and actions against the nuclear power.
160
 After that, the Rood 
Verzetsfront continued its existence in the form of a publishing enterprise until the late 1980s.   
 As mentioned earlier, RVF was looking at helping people involved in armed struggle 
also more concretely than merely by seeking publicity for their cause and conditions. In this 
context, the name of another Rode Jeugd veteran, Henk Wubben, has come out. 
 
 
Henk Wubben, RVF and RAF
161
 
 
One of the questions that keep intriguing the students of the left-wing movements in the 1970s is 
what Henk Wubben did after 1974. Soon after the disbandment of Rode Jeugd, he moved to 
Amsterdam and started to study cultural anthropology at the university. He was still seen in the 
radical left-wing circles, but did not seem to play a particularly prominent role in Rode Hulp or any 
other grouping. As zealous as he felt about the idea of revolution, he seemed to be very doubtful 
about the prospects for revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands and, perhaps even more, about 
capabilities of his potential partners in it. 
 In the last years of Rode Jeugd, Henk Wubben had been calling for more professional 
attitude and methods. Also after the disbandment of Rode Jeugd, he remained highly critical about 
the activities of other former Rode Jeugd people. This came especially clear in the letters he wrote 
to some of them in June 1975 where he expressed his disappointment that people seemed not to be 
have taken warning of the past mistakes and that they were not doing enough to get to the bottom of 
the case of Luciën van Hoesel. In the letter, he broke off all contacts with them.
162
 
Henk Wubben had his eyes more on what was going on in West Germany and 
oriented his activities towards supporting the groupings waging the revolutionary struggle there. He 
was active in several organizations supporting RAF. He had established many contacts with 
German comrades already during Rode Jeugd time, for example with people involved in so-called 
Knastgruppen (prison groups) that supported the imprisoned German activists. Through this, he met 
a lot of people who later joined RAF and went underground. Wubben himself never became part of 
an illegal structure, but instead had a role in das Umfeld, thus the support networks of RAF. He 
emphasizes that this help did not include renting cars or houses, because a professional organization 
like RAF does not make itself vulnerable by giving such tasks and thereby the knowledge about 
                                                 
160
 Moussault 2009, 141, 165-166, 222; Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 1998, 59. 
161
 Information about Henk Wubben’s activities in this sub-chapter is based on interview with Henk Wubben by Leena 
Malkki on 15 July 2003 unless mentioned otherwise. 
162
 ”Aan: Willem Oskam, Joost van Steenis, Evert v.d. Berg, Aat van Wyk en Lucien van Hoesel” (letter written by 
Henk Wubben, 26 June 1975).  
their bases to outsiders. He gives the impression that he has been one of those who RAF had more 
trust in, but avoids being specific about his activities.  
Some cues about the degree of his involvement can be found from what is known 
about his activities. From them, it can be derived that he has considered himself capable of hiding 
explosives and taking care of a German comrade escaping from prison.
163
 Considering the length 
and palpable strength of his commitment to the struggle of RAF, it would be surprising if he had 
kept himself for the whole time in the margins. Fully in the line with his thinking and way of action 
is also not to betray his comrades by a too detailed babble over his past activities. 
 It has been claimed that Wubben has acted as an important contact person between 
RVF and RAF
164
, and there is no reason to doubt that. His contacts with RVF originate from the 
beginnings of the organization. According to him, the Eekens were in the process of directing their 
activities from supporting the Palestinian cause more into supporting RAF and they were looking 
for people already involved in such activities. In the context of Rood Verzetsfront, Wubben was 
involved in developing the political line of the grouping and helped with the printing press. He was 
also involved in some actions that were organized in support of RAF.  
His role in the initiatives for armed struggle is not clear. In any case, he did not then 
and does not nowadays reject the idea of committing e.g. small-scale bomb attacks or occupations. 
Through such kind of militant actions, people could train and explore “whether they were fit for the 
hard work”. According to Moussault, he would have been part of the B-group and involved in 
various plans for robberies and bombings.
165
  
 In the 1980s, Wubben withdrew slowly from the involvement in the armed struggle. A 
crucial turning point in this regard was in June 1980 when his home where he lived with Ciska 
Eeken was almost totally destroyed by an explosion. A couple of days afterwards, Wubben was 
arrested for hiding explosives. While Wubben maintains that the explosion was work of the German 
intelligence agencies in consequence of the unsuccessful attempts to infiltration through him, many 
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people are convinced that explosion was most probably caused by his own accident with the 
handling of explosives.
166
 
 After the campaign of Rood Verzetsfront sputtered out, there has never come another 
similar kind of opportunity for a revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands that Wubben would have 
found worthwhile. He still holds the struggles that Rote Armee Fraktion and other groups were 
engaged in as honorable and just ones. 
Nowadays Henk Wubben lives together with Ciska Brakenhoff (formerly Eeken) in a 
street named after one of the heroes of the Dutch resistance movement during the Second World 
War. In 1997, his book on North Korea was published and he occasionally lectures and interviews 
on the theme. Ciska Brakenhoff, on her part, remains steadfast in her refusal to give interviews.  
 
Joost van Steenis and the concept of small violence 
 
 
Of the former Rode Jeugd people, Joost van Steenis is one of those who have stayed involved in the 
radical politics the longest. After Rode Jeugd, he too took part in Rode Hulp for a time. Others, 
however, had serious reservations about his concept for anti-imperialist struggle. According to Van 
Steenis, the concept of urban guerrilla did not suit well to the prevailing circumstances in the 
developed countries. Instead, the best way for action was the use of “small violence”, that is all 
kinds of acts that required little from the logistics. Most typically these acts would be directed 
against the power holders of imperialist and capitalist system in person, such as harassment, 
intimidation and other deeds that disturb their lives.
167
 Most others did not support this idea and 
Joost van Steenis and his participation in Rode Hulp was effectively over.
168
  
 From the late 1970s on, Van Steenis has been active in various movements. In 1977, 
he was a parliamentary candidate for a small party called Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur 
(Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule). One year later, he established, together with his friend 
Tom de Booij (who had also been active in Rode Hulp), an organization called Schoon van 
Lichaam, Helder van Geest (Clean Body, Lucid Mind) which purported the doctrine of small 
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violence, as well as Stichting Macht & Elite (Foundation Power and Elite), which had the research 
on the balance of power in the western countries as its task. In the early 1980s, he was actively 
involved in squatter movement as well as the movement against nuclear power.
169
 Nowadays he 
maintains a Foundation Power and Elite website where he publishes his letters, articles and books.  
Part of Van Steenis’ ideology is the propagation of autonomy of individuals and 
autonomous action. His opposition of all elites includes also reservations against strict organization 
of resistance against the ruling elite, because “centralization will always lead to the rise of a new 
elite”.170 As this shows, Van Steenis has largely left behind the Marxist-Leninist ideology in its 
most typical form and has done so already in the late 1970s.
171
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